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Abstract: The conference theme invites contrasts between objectivity and bias, since the two are commonly consid-
ered contraries. But there are a variety of meanings of the two and a corresponding variety of contraries. Thus there 
is a problem for any attempt to discuss bias and objectivity in relation to argument as a contrasting pair. Still, several 
senses of both terms relate to argumentation. I offer an inventory of them. 
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1. Introduction 
 
I would like to make two preliminary points and stipulate some terminology before getting down 
to business.  
First, this paper is an exercise in meta-theoretical analysis, not ground-level analysis. Alt-
hough I discuss objectivity and bias, I do so with a view to supporting a claim about theorizing 
about objectivity and bias in relation to argument. The second point is a reminder of the old dis-
tinction between lumping analyses and splitting analyses. That is, some analyses call for an em-
phasis on what things share and how they can best be understood as aspects or variations of a 
single entity, whereas others call for an emphasis on what distinguishes things that might other-
wise be conflated. In the case at hand, as will be clear shortly, it seems to me that conflation in-
vites confusion, so the paper is an exercise in splitting, not lumping. 
As for terminology, I here mean by an argument a claim and a reason for accepting it. 
Such arguments are typically used to attempt to persuade an interlocutor or audience, but can also 
be used to investigate the case that can be made for a claim, perhaps among other things. The 
“type/token” distinction applies to arguments: argument types are abstract entities; argument to-
kens are particulars: unique, relative to author, audience, occasion, venue and other features of 
context. (Thus the ontological argument for God’s existence is an argument type; Anselm’s and 
Descartes’s versions of the ontological argument are tokens of that type.) I use argumentation to 
denote both an extended body of related arguments and the activity of differing parties engaging 
in exchanges of arguments. 
The theme of the OSSA11 conference—“Argumentation, Objectivity and Bias”—invites 
contrasts between objectivity and bias, since these two states of affairs are commonly considered 
to be contraries, or even contradictories: bias impedes objectivity; lack of objectivity stems from 
bias; objectivity requires eliminating bias. However, in calling up this trope, the theme also un-
wittingly invites discussions at cross-purposes or other confusions, for, as I will argue, there are 
varieties of meanings of both objectivity and bias. It might turn out that to be objective in any 
sense is not the same as being unbiased in any sense, and that to be biased in any sense is not the 
same as a failure of objectivity in any sense. In fact when either bias or objectivity is understood 
in any of its senses that relates to arguments or argumentation and that involves a contrast with its 
contraries, in most cases those contraries will not include, respectively, objectivity or bias. To 
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show that this is so, I catalogue the different meanings of bias and of objectivity and for each one 
note its contraries. It will become evident that in most cases the items in the two catalogues pair 
up with quite different contraries. 
Based on these analyses, there is a problem for any attempt to discuss bias and objectivity 
in relation to arguments or argumentation along the lines that the two form a contrasting pair—
that is, that they are contraries. To be sure, it remains possible that there are several senses of bias 
in which bias can affect arguments, and several senses of objectivity in which objectivity can be 
seen as a desirable or an undesirable property of argumentation. And it also remains possible that 
it requires a bias of some sort to value objectivity of some kind—that being objective in some 
sense is to exhibit a bias. I will propose an inventory or map of different possible issues that are 
spawned by each sense of the two concepts. 
 
2. Senses of ‘biased’ and ‘objective’ (species of bias and objectivity) 
 
I first turn to catalogue the various senses of ‘biased’ and ‘objective’. In a paper called “What Is 
Bias?” published long ago (reprinted in Blair 2012) I wrote: 
 
The root idea of bias . . . is that it is a slant, an angle, a leaning or a limited perspective [“a kind of 
leaning, or an inclination or a predisposition” (2012, p. 31)]. This idea seems to appear in three 
types of cases: (1) bias that is bad and avoidable; (2) bias that is unavoidable, potentially dangerous 
but for which one can compensate; and (3) bias that is contingent and good—or a least neutral. 
(2012, p. 23) 
 
This account still seems accurate to me, so I take the general concept of bias to be unproblematic, 
although complex.  
“Our usage of the word ‘objectivity’”, writes Lorraine Daston (1992, p. 597), “... is hope-
lessly but revealingly confused.” She continues: 
 
Current usage allows us to apply the word as an approximate synonym for the empirical 
(or, more narrowly, the factual); for the scientific, in the sense of public, empirically veri-
fiable knowledge; for impartiality-unto-self-effacement and the cold-blooded restraint of 
the emotions; for the sense of compelling assent from all rational minds, be they lodged in 
human, Martian or angelic bodies; and for the ‘really real’, that is to say, objects in them-
selves independent of all minds except, perhaps, that of God. (1992, pp. 597-598)  
 
Daston goes on to show how these and various other meanings developed historically, with suc-
cessive senses building in layers upon their predecessors rather than displacing them. In the pre-
sent paper I am interested in distinguishing different senses of ‘bias’ and ‘objectivity’, that is, dif-
ferent varieties of bias and of objectivity, so Daston’s thesis is grist for my mill and her analysis 
informs my distinctions.1 
I identify fine-grained senses of the terms ‘biased’ and ‘objective’ and note the contrast 
terms that attach to each of them. Using that approach, a survey of definitions and examples re-
veals at least six senses of ‘biased’ (or kinds of bias) and at least six senses of ‘objective’ (or 
kinds of objectivity). Which of these relate to argument or argumentation, and if so, how, will be 
considered later. 
 
                                                 
1 Thanks to Cate Hundleby for putting me on to Daston’s work. 
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2.1. Senses of ‘biased’ (the adjective) 
 
Here are six senses of ‘biased’.  
 
B1: Unfair, partial. A judge of an athletic contest (such as a those involving box-
ing, diving, figure skating, gymnastics, mogul skiing, ski jumping or synchronized 
swimming) or for a literary prize, or a flower show, a beauty contest, or for best 
apple pie at the county fair, is biased in this sense when she or he is unfair in the 
sense of being partial by favouring or disfavouring some competitor or group of 
competitors. Certain flaws in a person’s or group’s performance are overlooked or 
weighted too lightly and/or certain virtues are weighted too heavily—or the re-
verse. A judge in a court of law is biased in this sense when partial to one litigant 
over another in a civil suit or to the prosecution or the defence in a criminal trial. 
Some arguments or items of evidence are given more or less weight than they de-
serve, or allowed or disallowed when they shouldn’t be, and so on. Having a bias 
in this sense is bad, and it is avoidable.  
The contradictory of ‘biased’ in this sense—fair or impartial—is not the 
same as objective. Contraries are uncommitted, open-minded or balanced, not ob-
jective. 
  
B2: Closed-minded, prejudiced.  A person is said to be biased or to have a bias in 
this sense when she or he values or disvalues arbitrarily or without sufficient evi-
dence all of some class of entities. One can be biased in this sense by being preju-
diced against members of ethnic groups or social classes or occupational groups or 
genders. Sexism, racism, nationalistic chauvinism are all biases in this sense. Such 
attitudes are both avoidable, and to be condemned.  
The contradictories, open-minded or unprejudiced, do not mean the same 
as objective. The contraries are tolerant, unblinkered or inclusive, not objective. 
 
B3: Having a preference/dis-preference. In one’s reading habits, one can have a 
bias against romantic poetry or science fiction or histories, and be biased in favour 
of police procedurals or westerns or biographies. Serious music listeners can tend 
to have a bias for some genres and against others—say for classical jazz or against 
early rock and roll. Having such biases is a contingent property—some have them, 
others do not—and it is generally regarded as value-neutral: neither a virtue nor a 
vice. 
To have no preference or dis-preference is not to be objective; it’s to be 
neutral. Contraries of this sense of ‘biased’ are eclectic (in one’s range of tastes), 
uncommitted or catholic, not objective.  
 
B4. Disproportional. The sex of sea turtles is determined by the temperature of 
their eggs during their incubation in the sand of the beaches where they are laid. 
Warmer temperatures cause the turtles to form as females. For instance, sea turtle 
eggs laid in black sand beaches, which absorb more heat from the sun than white 
sand beaches, produce a higher percentage of female turtles than eggs laid in white 
sand beaches. There is a concern among sea turtle biologists that global warming 
due to climate change is causing what they term highly biased sex ratios among 
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sea turtles, that is, producing disproportionate numbers of females (too many) and 
males (too few) (Wyneken and Lolavar 2015). This kind of bias is unavoidable, 
given climate change, potentially dangerous, and in the case of humans, or with 
human assistance, can be compensated for. Or, to take another example, a sample 
in survey research is biased in this sense when there is a greater or lesser represen-
tation in the sample of a salient group of the target population than exists in the 
population at large. To reason or argue from biased samples is to mislead, and re-
sults in falsehoods; thus it is bad, and to be avoided. 
Unbiased sex ratios among sea turtles are not objective sex ratios; and an 
unbiased sample is not an objective sample. Contraries of ‘biased’ in this sense are 
representative, typical, balanced, or, in some cases, equal; but certainly not objec-
tive. 
 
B5. Cognitively misaligned. It is to this sense that the much-discussed concept of 
cognitive bias belongs. Cognitive bias is hypothesized as the explanation of a vari-
ety of approaches that can lead to mistaken calculations and other kinds of errone-
ous decision making judgments, such as medical misdiagnoses. Cognitive bias is 
characterized as a predisposition, in some cases unavoidable, to use a heuristic that 
might generally serve well for quick judgments but that can or will cause errors 
when dealing with more subtle or complicated problems. For instance in judg-
ments of representativeness, there is tendency to be insensitive to the prior proba-
bility of outcomes or to the relevance of sample size, or to fall prey to misconcep-
tions of chance (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, in Kahneman 2011, pp. 420-422). 
Or in assessing the frequency of a class or the probability of an event, there is a 
tendency to rely on evidence that is readily brought to mind and as a consequence 
to overlook more relevant but less available data (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, in 
Kahneman 2011, pp. 425-427). There is evidence that people tend to be improper-
ly influenced in their judgments by being anchored in the initial presentation or 
description of the problem, and people fail to adjust for relevant differences such 
as the different probabilities of conjunctive and of disjunctive events (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1974, in Kahneman 2011, pp. 427-428).  Relying on research like 
that of Tversksy and Kahneman, in a well-known paper Croskerry (2003) has pro-
duced a long list of what he terms “cognitive dispositions to respond” that can lead 
to medical misdiagnoses.2 A couple of examples from his list are confirmation bi-
as: “the tendency to look for confirming evidence to support a diagnosis rather 
than look for disconfirming evidence to refute it” and diagnostic momentum: 
“once diagnostic labels are attached to a patient they tend to become stickier and 
stickier” (Croskerry 2003, p. 777).3 Some of these biases, such as the well-known 
“gamblers’ fallacy” are avoidable; others seem to be hard-wired. All are potential-
                                                 
2 Croskerry prefers not to use the term ‘bias’ for fear that its pejorative connotation will result in resistance to cogni-
tive de-biasing strategies: “Removing the stigma of bias clears the way towards accepting the capricious nature of 
decision-making, and perhaps goes some way toward exculpating clinicians when their diagnoses fail” (Croskerry 
2003, p. 776). 
3 I am aware that there is a large literature on cognitive bias. While some of it is controversial, there tends to be 
agreement about the phenomena, so I see no need to cite more than a couple of illustrative examples. The controver-
sy concerns the best explanation of the phenomena, which is not my interest here. 
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ly dangerous, because they can influence judgments that can result in harm, and 
even, in some situations, such as medical diagnoses, judgments that are matters of 
life and death. Some cognitive biases, but perhaps not all—and this is controver-
sial—can be compensated for: that is, anticipated and their effects guarded against.  
There can be institutional bias in this sense. There is some evidence, for 
example, that elements of the American prosecutorial system have confirmation 
bias in favour of convictions.  Once a suspect is identified, often only evidence 
supporting his or her guilt is sought, and supporting accusations of self-interested 
parties such as jailhouse snitches, are accepted at face value and not checked (The 
Economist, 2014).4 
To not be cognitively biased in these sorts of ways is to be cognitively so-
phisticated or cognitively astute. It is not to be objective. 
 
B6. Unbalanced, one-sided, slanted. A news media outlet such as a newspaper or 
a TV or radio station or network is biased in this sense when its news reporting is 
unbalanced. More news stories about a favoured group than a disfavoured group 
are reported; or more positive news stories about the former and/or more negative 
news stores about the latter are reported when this is not the actual distribution of 
positive and negative events. Or the reporting of a particular event is biased by vir-
tue of selecting or emphasizing facts or descriptions that unjustifiably favour (or 
disfavour) a particular party, or a particular interpretation of events. When contro-
versies are being reported, a news report can be biased in the sense of being slant-
ed when it favours one side over the others in many ways, for instance, by virtue 
of its language or its emphasis, or due to its selection of what to include and what 
to omit, or due to the ordering of the events described. Such a bias is a bad thing, 
and is avoidable, and as such deserving of condemnation. 
A contrary of ‘biased’ in this sense is balanced. Here at last is a sense of 
biased whose contradictory, unbiased, means objective. 
  
2.2. Senses of ‘objective’ (the adjective) 
 
And here are six senses of ‘objective’.  
 
O1. Factual, agreed-upon. An account or report of events, a description, a charac-
terization is said to be objective in this sense when it is true to the facts, when any 
observer would agree with it or would report, describe or characterize the event in 
similar terms. It is not objective in this sense when it is influenced by whimsy, or 
peculiarity of focus—idiosyncrasies of the person reporting, describing or charac-
terizing—or when it is value-laden, instead of neutral.5 A person is objective in 
this sense when he or she strives for fidelity, completeness and value neutrality. 
This is Daston’s sense of “empirical” objectivity.  
                                                 
4 Thanks to Doug Walton for this example. 
5 There is some point to the objection that value-free descriptions are a myth, but still, there is a difference between 
“six grizzlies were feeding on the migrating salmon” and “six savage behemoths were gorging themselves on the 
defenceless migrants”. 
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 Contraries of ‘objective’ in this sense are fanciful, misrepresentative, val-
ue-laden. An objective account in this sense is not the same as an unbiased ac-
count; it’s an accurate account. 
 
O2. Impersonal, detached. A judgment is said to be objective in this sense if the 
assessor’s personal preferences do not influence it and instead it is made according 
to the appropriate criteria and standards. Thus an account of a new car’s features, 
merits and faults, or a description of a wine’s characteristics, weaknesses and 
strengths, is objective when the account does not simply express the reporter’s 
likes and dislikes, and when it applies the criteria appropriate in the circumstances 
for judging cars or wines.  
 Contraries of ‘objective’ in this sense are subjective or personal, not bi-
ased. 
 
O3. Realistic. When the proponents of a cause are planning a campaign to seek 
support, whether moral, financial or both, some of them might think that others are 
overly optimistic in their expectations. “We need to be realistic,” someone will 
say, “We need to look at the situation objectively.” The point in general is to not 
allow enthusiasm, or its opposite, pessimism—that is, subjective factors—to dis-
tort perceptions of the true nature of a situation.  
 Contraries of ‘objective’ in this sense are overly optimistic or overly pes-
simistic; being unrealistic is not being biased. 
 
O4. Bare-bones, strictly factual, purely observational. A report is objective in this 
sense when there is no embellishment, no editorializing comments, no attributions 
of motives or of assumptions. The observer’s reactions to or attitudes towards 
what is reported are not recorded. Here is the self-effacing, emotion-restraining 
sense of ‘objective’ that Daston catalogues. 
 Contraries of ‘objective’ in this sense are subjective, impressionistic, or 
opinionated. An impressionistic or opinionated account is not thereby a biased ac-
count. 
 
O5. A-perspectival. Daston discusses another sense of ‘objective’, not mentioned 
in the list I quoted above, which is perhaps found particularly in philosophical and 
some scientific writing, namely being objective in the sense of taking no point of 
view, of transcending particularity of focus and escaping any special interests. 
Theories are from this vantage point supposed to be from no vantage point. See 
Thomas Nagel’s (1986) famous “view from Nowhere”.  
 Contraries here include grounded, contextual, embedded; its contradictory, 
“perspectival”, is not the same as “unbiased”. 
 
O6. Balanced, all perspectives considered fairly. A commission set up to write a 
report on the treatment of its aboriginal peoples by the post-colonial Canadian 
federal and provincial governments is expected to be objective in the sense that it 
considers testimony from all those involved in such treatment, including not only 
those in all the aboriginal groups affected, but also the public and private agencies 
delivering such treatment, and the private corporations involved as well.  Also, not 
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just the mistakes and mistreatment that occurred should be reported; the benefits 
and the successes should be covered as well. Journalists who strive for objectivity 
operationalize that goal by seeking to report in a balanced way, reporting the 
views of all parties in disputed matters without giving undue emphasis to any one 
and writing or speaking in such a way as to make it impossible to detect which 
view they personally favour. 
 The failure to be objective in this sense is to be one-sided, selective or bi-
ased. 
 A particular version of this sense of ‘objective’ was found in a meta-ethical 
theory of moral philosophy in the third quarter of the 20th century, the ideal ob-
server theory (see Firth 1952). Unlike its cousin, the a-perspectival perspective, 
the ideal observer was objective by virtue of taking into account all relevant per-
spectives while being the agent or captive of none of them in particular, and espe-
cially being wed to no particular set of interests. To be objective in one’s ethical 
judgments, both practical and theoretical, it was thought, was to take the vantage 
point of the ideal observer and the correct judgment was regarded as the one that 
an ideal observer would make. 
 Someone whose judgments were influenced by some perspective in partic-
ular was not being objective, but was interested or and in some cases could be 
considered to be partial or biased. 
 
Not all the items on these two lists have anything to do with arguments or 
argumentation. That connection is a matter to be taken up in Section 4, below. The 
first order of business has been just to get a sense for the variety of senses of ‘bi-
ased’ and ‘objective’, and so of bias and objectivity. Also, just as having a bias is 
to be condemned in some senses but innocent or neutral others, similarly I do not 
suggest that being objective is always desirable or admirable; it may well as de-
noted in some senses be a mistake and to be condemned. And in some senses it 
seems to me that objectivity is in fact impossible, so seeking it, or trying to ap-
proximate it, is thus misconceived and foolish.  
 
Some critics of these two lists might complain that I am splitting hairs, and that, at least in 
some cases, if not all, one alleged sense of biased or objective is indistinguishable from another. 
Others might complain that my lists are incomplete. I am sympathetic to both objections. At least 
a couple of distinctions are admittedly quite fine-grained. However, whether or not I have pinned 
down accurately each of these distinctions, I do think that reflection on how we used these terms 
reveals several senses of each one, if not exactly these six. And if there are more, my thesis might 
be even more strongly supported. Moreover, as will emerge below, it turns out that each of these 
senses that can figure in arguments or argumentation one way or another (if at all) does so in its 
own way, and that fact is indirect support for these distinctions. So I appeal to these critics to re-
serve judgment for a bit. 
 
3. Corresponding contraries 
 
If objectivity and bias are indeed a contrasting pair in at least one sense of each of the two terms, 
there must be at least one match—that is, at least one sense of the one that is a contrary (or con-
tradictory) of at least one sense of the other. If the above survey of senses of ‘biased’ and ‘objec-
J. ANTHONY BLAIR 
 8 
tive’ is accurate, then although there are several senses of each of the two terms, there is only one 
such match. B6, being biased in the sense of being unbalanced, one-sided and selective is the 
contrary of being objective in the sense, O6, of being balanced and considering all the relevant 
perspectives. The above list identifies five other ways of being biased, but their contraries are not 
ways of being objective, and it identifies five other ways of being objective, but their contraries 
are not ways of being biased. Table 1 portrays this state of affairs. 
 
Senses of ‘biased’ & their contraries Senses of ‘objective’ & their contraries 
B1: Unfair, partial Uncommitted, open-
minded, balanced 
No correspondence 
B2: Closed-minded, prej-
udiced 
Tolerant, unblinkered, 
inclusive 
No correspondence 
B3: Having a preference Eclectic, uncommitted, 
catholic 
No correspondence 
B4. Disproportional Representative, typical, 
equal 
No correspondence 
B5. Cognitively misa-
ligned 
cognitively astute No correspondence 
B6. Unbalanced, one-
sided, slanted 
balanced, fair or objective ? 
No correspondence O1 Factual, agreed-upon Fanciful, misrepresenta-
tive, value laden 
No correspondence O2. Impersonal, detached Subjective, personal 
No correspondence O3. Realistic overly optimistic or pes-
simistic 
No correspondence O4. Bare-bones, strictly 
factual, purely observa-
tional 
subjective, impression-
istic, opinionated 
No correspondence 
 
O5. A-perspectival grounded, contextual, 
embedded 
? O6. Balanced, all perspec-
tives considered; ideal 
observer point of view 
one-sided, selective, in-
complete,  unbalanced, 
interested, biased 
 
Table l.  Senses of ‘biased’ and ‘objective’ and their contraries 
 
4. Implications 
 
If the above survey and analyses are correct, it follows that any discussion of bias and objectivity 
in arguments or in argumentation should tend to be, for the most part, an independent discussion 
of one sense or another of either of the two concepts and a discussion of the relation of that par-
ticular sense of that concept to arguments and argumentation. Thus, for example, in Douglas 
Walton’s book, One-Sided Arguments, A Dialectical Analysis of Bias (1999), several kinds of 
bias are discussed, but none of these is contrasted with objectivity. In fact Walton explicitly ad-
dresses the relation between bias and objectivity (pp. 62-65), and contends that “bias [in argu-
mentation] is not the same thing as absence of ... objectivity” (p. 63). Walton’s position is con-
sistent with our findings. A treatment of objectivity and bias will be a discussion of a pair of phe-
nomena related by being opposites only if, either it is about bias in the sense of lack of balance, 
slant or unfairness vs. objectivity in the sense of balance or fairness, or else it is about some other 
contrasting pair of senses of these two terms that I have overlooked. 
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I say this is so for the most part, because I can think of one exception, which I discuss be-
low.  
It follows from these distinctions that (for the most part) discussions of the relation be-
tween bias and argumentation might take different forms, some focusing on one sense of bias and 
others focusing on some other sense of bias. Likewise discussions of the relation between objec-
tivity and argumentation might take different forms. Here is a speculative list of some kinds of 
possible connections between bias and argument and between objectivity and argument that 
might be worth investigating. 
  
B1. Bias in the sense of a disposition to unfairness would feature in examinations 
of the ethics of argumentation. We see this bias affecting in contemporary political 
argumentation when exaggerations and outright lies are used as premises in argu-
ments aimed at demonizing the opponent or at inciting fear and anxiety. Deliberate 
straw man attacks, which are frequent occurrences in political adversarial debates, 
exhibit bias in this sense. Mr. Trump has excelled at ad hominem rejoinders during 
the contest for the Republican nominee for President in the next U.S. election, 
both tu quoque and ethotic (abusive) versions (see Walton 1998). 
  
B2. A bias in the sense of a prejudice or close-mindedness can affect argumenta-
tion in various ways. It can lead to a failure to appreciate the merits of an oppo-
nent’s position or arguments. It can result in a failure to be aware of, or to take se-
riously, positions or arguments of others that have a bearing on the issue at hand. 
It can result in the unjustified dismissal or neglect of views that are worthy of con-
sideration. In political or public policy argumentation, such biases produce un-
democratic positions often at odds with constitutional values. 
 
B3. A bias in the sense of a preference for or against some object of interest strikes 
me as one use of the term that does not have much general connection with argu-
ment. However, in a particular argument the accusation that someone is biased in 
this sense can work to discount an appeal for or against the object in question, as 
in “Given your bias you would think the library should stock more science fic-
tion”; and a confession of a bias in this sense can work to defuse a criticism, as in 
“I hope you won’t mind the background music: the restaurant owner has a bias for 
the swing era.”  
 
B4. In statistical reasoning and arguments issuing from it, biased samples result in 
mistaken inferences when generalizing from properties of a sample to those of a 
population. 
 
B5. Cognitive biases have been demonstrated to result in mistaken inferences, 
which can result in bad arguments being offered or accepted. The connection be-
tween cognitive biases and fallacies merits examination (see Bokmelder 2014). Do 
they dispose people to commit fallacies? Is the commission of a fallacy causally 
related to cognitive biases? Are they two unrelated phenomena? Which issues are 
empirical and which ones are conceptual in the question of the connection be-
tween cognitive biases and fallacies?  
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B6. On bias in the sense of lack of balance, see O6., below. 
 
There appear also to be questions surrounding the connection between the different kinds 
of objectivity and argument.  
 
O1. Being objective in the sense of being factual in situations in which facts exist 
and are needed seems a virtue in thinking in general, and so, in argument. A call 
for objectivity in this sense when the relevant grounds are not undisputed facts is a 
false appeal, akin to the plea to “Be reasonable!” when the interlocutor happens 
simply to be disagreeing. 
 
O2. The virtue of objectivity in argumentation in the sense of detachment seems 
less straightforward. Rhetorically, the appearance of detachment seems likely to 
be an advantage in some kinds of argumentative situation, and a defect in others. 
Earnest advocacy seems more authentic, and strong commitment to a cause can 
motivate rigorous examination of the interests and arguments of various parties to 
it. At the same time it can result in my-side reasoning and the failure to give alter-
native positions and objections their due. Also the importance of emotion in argu-
ment calls into question the value of objectivity in the sense of detachment (see 
Tindale 2015, Ch. 8). These are matters deserving of closer examination. 
  
O3. Being objective in the sense of being realistic strikes me as generally an ad-
vantage both in advocacy arguments and in using arguments to investigate hy-
potheses. One is usually better off having an accurate understanding of the merits 
and defects or weaknesses of one’s case or views and those of alternatives to it or 
them. On the other hand there are plenty of examples of people who persevere in 
the defence of unpopular or unlikely positions and, against all odds, are successful 
or proven right in the end. Had they been objective about it in the sense of being 
realistic about its prospects, they would never have succeeded.  How one is best to 
draw the line here might be a question worth examining. 
 
O4. Similarly, there seems to be a time for objectivity in the sense of being drily 
descriptive and a time for eschewing such objectivity in favour of personal opin-
ions and impressionistic accounts. The advice of rhetoricians is needed to inform 
advocates of when argumentation requires the one and when the other.  
 
O5. Being objective in the sense of being a-perspectival strikes me as problematic. 
It seems an impossible stance for anyone to take in practice, and dicey to attempt 
to approximate. Claims to such objectivity in argumentation can easily mask bias-
es of which their owners are unaware, as many studies of male chauvinism and 
racism have shown. Claiming objectivity in this sense when evaluating arguments 
looks like taking the “God’s-eye-view” to which Hamblin famously objected in 
Fallacies: “. . . if I as a former onlooker decide to intervene to give Smith the good 
tidings that his argument is valid or Jones the news that his premisses are false, I 
am likely to find that I have become simply another participant in an enlarged dia-
lectical situation . . . .” (Hamblin 1970, pp. 242-243). On the other hand, the alter-
native does not seem to be subjectivity in the sense of relativism.  During the 
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drafting of arguments to be presented in some advocacy situation, one can and one 
does critique one’s own drafts. 
 
O6. Objectivity and bias constitute legitimate contraries, I suggest, when bias is 
understood in the sense of lack of balance, or one-sidedness, and objectivity is un-
derstood in the sense of fair consideration of all views and due treatment of all the 
interests and perspectives bearing on an issue. They both in these senses have im-
plications for argumentation, or so it would seem—and this is an issue worth in-
vestigating. My-sided reasoning in “makes-sense” epistemology (see Perkins 
1991) might be regarded as entailing a failure to meet dialectical obligations, for it 
appears to consist of the exclusive consideration of ground-level arguments and 
overlooks the need for such meta-arguments (Finocchiaro 2013) as replies to ob-
jections to premises, to inference links or to one’s conclusion (see also Johnson 
2000 on the dialectical tier). The use of arguments to inquire might be hamstrung 
by such a bias or failure of objectivity, for it appears to prevent a thorough vetting 
of the hypotheses being examined. This failure also appears to impede the crucial 
rhetorical imperative of understanding one’s audience from its own point of view. 
These and other possible effects of this sort of objectivity being impeded by this 
sort of bias deserve investigation. 
 In short, there is plenty of room for the study of the relations between dif-
ferent senses of bias and argument, and for the study of the relations between dif-
ferent senses of objectivity and argument, but not so much room for the study of a 
contrast between bias and objectivity in relation to argument. 
 The exception occurs when bias and objectivity are not considered as con-
traries, but when one is a condition of the other, and when it is not individuals but 
the norms of practices that are biased. Think of the practice of removing any firsts-
person pronouns in scientific writing such as laboratory reports. It at least used to 
be the case that lab reports were supposed to be completely objective. They were 
written in the passive voice. “I observed that ...” was to be struck and replaced by, 
“It was observed that ... .” This banishing of so-called subjectivity is an example 
of an institutional bias in the social sciences. In their eagerness to be counted as a 
science, social scientists aped the conventions of reporting followed by natural 
scientists, thereby conveying an impression of detachment or impersonality, that 
is, of objectivity, that is often illusory. When conclusions are being drawn from 
psychological or sociological data thus reported, this false sense of objectivity gets 
introduced into the argument. This is one example, and there might well be others. 
5.  Summary 
I close with a brief summary. I have appealed to our ordinary usage of the terms ‘bias’ and ‘bi-
ased,’ and ‘objectivity’ and ‘objective’ to support the contention that there is a variety of species 
or senses of each concept. An examination of the contraries of each species, I have contended, 
reveals that for all but one, there is no contrary that makes reference to the other concept. In other 
words, bias and objectivity, in most of their senses, do not form a contrasting pair. If this finding 
is correct, it follows that the theme of the conference, “Argumentation, Objectivity and Bias,” 
runs the danger of falsely implying that the contrast between objectivity and bias has broad im-
plication for argumentation. However, this finding does not imply that there is nothing to think 
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and say about the separate relations of different senses of objectivity and argument, and of differ-
ent senses of bias and argument, nor does it imply that the norm of objectivity in some contexts 
cannot itself be an instance of a bias.  
Acknowledgements: Thanks to CRRAR Fellows Catherine Hundleby, Curtis Hyra, Ralph John-
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led to improvements to an earlier version of this paper. 
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